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Le jugement doit être rigoureusement caractérisé
dans son existence. 
(P. Valéry)
1 In 1938, in his book Logic: the Theory of Inquiry, John Dewey (1859-1952) established legal
judgment as a model for the understanding of judgment in general. The aim of this paper
is to consider three theses applying to legal judgment and see if they can also apply to
judgment in general. Should that be the case, then Dewey’s idea would be confirmed (at
least  with relation to such theses);  should it  not be the case,  Dewey’s idea would be
falsified.
2 By “legal judgment” we shall mean the verdict deciding a legal case (including the factual
and normative reasons for making it). Then, from a philosophical point of view, the three
theses will be discussed with reference to some ideas by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and
within a pragmatist  framework,  insofar as Dewey embraced it.  More specifically,  this
paper  will  focus  on  Peirce’s  theory  of  inference,  scientific  method,  judgment  and
assertion. Our conclusion on Dewey’s hypothesis will be an affirmative one and, finally, a
complex  conception  of  judgment,  accounting  for  both  its  social  and  psychological
dimensions, will be suggested.
3 On the topic of judgment we must first register a prolonged and widespread philosophical
silence; indeed, it is undeniable that judgment plays a marginal role in the philosophy of
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the 20th century.1 However, because of its indisputable relevance for both a philosophical
and a juridical point of view, we propose to address the subject from both perspectives, in
the hope that the merits of the one will not be annulled by the shortcomings of the other. 
4 To  start  with,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  the  following  three  different
conceptions of judgment: 
5 (A) Judgment as a mental act attributing a predicate to a subject 
(B) Judgment as an act of assent to a proposition 
(C) Judgment as a process leading to a proposition. 
6 The first is, broadly speaking, the traditional conception that can be found in Peirce’s
early thoughts; the second one is expounded in his later writings and, in a sense, by Frege
too; the third one is considered, among others, by Dewey. The three theses will be based
on these three conceptions. The purpose of a judgment is to determine the connotation of
a subject or, in other words, to describe a given entity: this is (A), the ontological thesis.
Judgment approves the formed proposition,  acknowledging it  as  true:  this  is  (B),  the
alethic thesis. The proposition is not formed immediately, it develops through a process:
this is (C), what will be called genetic thesis. The first two concern, so to speak, the nature 
of judgment, while the third pertains to its dynamics.
7 Now, it needs to be established whether these theses truly apply to legal judgment and
whether they can contribute to an understanding of judgment in general. If that were the
case, Dewey’s hypothesis would be confirmed. Yet, a number of philosophical issues need
to be addressed before answering these questions. 
8 It should first be acknowledged that the three conceptions and the relative theses are not
in contradiction with one another. In fact, it can be argued that their conjunction actually
accounts for what a judgment is. Additionally, their conjunction also accounts for two
interesting relations:  the one between judgment and inference and the other between
judgment and assertion.
9 As to the relation between judgment and inference, judgment in the sense of (A), though
fundamental  from a  conceptual  point  of  view,  does  not  account  for  the  inferential,
normative and social dimensions of judgment and of legal judgment in particular. Per se,
(A) does not require making explicit the inferences underlying a judgment and justifying
it. Conversely, with respect to legal judgment, the rule of law requires judges to make
explicit  what reasons and inferences justify in their  view a decision (i.e.  the various
factual  and  normative  considerations  from  which  judgment  is  derived  through
argumentation). In this sense the first conception of judgment is too narrow to account
for both the intersubjective practices underlying judgment (at least in the judicial arena)
and the social practices where the premises of judgment need to be clarified to ensure
their controllability and the judger’s responsibility. The very concept of responsibility, in
particular, calls for a recognition of the social dimension judgment is involved in. The
same applies to conception (B), which must be integrated with an account of the process
forming the proposition being judged. It would seem therefore that only a thesis based on
conception (C) is capable of accounting for all this complex dynamics, although it is not
yet proven that a genetic thesis can account for the normative dimension of judgment. It
may very well be that certain aspects investigated by (C) belong to a level which is very
different from that of  a normative theory of judgment and of the logical  constraints
raised by (A) and (B). On the other hand, that would substantiate that it is the conjunction
of the three theses that accounts for judgment as a whole and for the relation between
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judgment and inference. To put it differently, only the conjunction of the three provides
a full understanding of judgment, given that (A) and (B) do not take into account the ways
in which judgment is formed.
10 As for the relation between judgment and assertion, there is clearly the need for a broad
conception of judgment, of the (C) type, in order to account for the responsibility implied
by an assertion. According to many authors, Peirce included, proposition and belief are
not acts.  On the contrary judgment and assertion belong to the category of acts,  the
difference between them being that the former is, so to speak, an internal act, while the
latter  is  an  external  one.2 We  will  try  to  show  that  this  characterization  does  not
sufficiently  consider  judgments  in  their  public  form  and  does  not  account  for  the
responsibility of assertion. From the genetic viewpoint, we shall suggest a conception of
judgment articulating it in three key and logically distinct stages: hypothesis, inquiry, and
result. In a certain way, this articulation is a translation of the nature of legal judgment as
a process, where the formation of the subject-matter is followed by a testing stage and
finally by decision.  Moreover,  this is  the development of a metaphor put forward by
Peirce in 1908 (CP 5.546): judgment is a ripening process. Clearly, it is only the evaluation
of  the  process  preceding  it  that  makes  it  possible  to  assess  the  responsibility  of  an
assertion. In fact, this way of characterizing (C) is compatible with the logical constraints
implied by (A) and (B). Consequently, the conjunction of the three theses and conceptions
appears to have the further capacity of accounting for the relation between judgment and
assertion too.
11 However, before dealing with their consequences and implications (which look promising
so far),  it  needs to be established whether the three theses are actually true of legal
judgment and of judgment in general as well.
 
The Ontological Thesis
12 The ontological thesis is about the content of a judgment act. In a certain sense judgment is
the attribution of a predicate to a subject (rather than of a subject to a predicate).3 In other
words, judgment determines the connotation of a subject rather than the denotation of a
predicate. Albeit almost irrelevant from a logical perspective, the difference in emphasis
is quite relevant to a theory of judgment. From an ontological perspective, judgment is
about an object with a certain attribute, not about an attribute exemplified by a certain
object. (In semiotic terms, this is an indexical thesis on judgment). Judgment is about
something specific, hic et nunc. Peirce conceives of judgment as a mental act by a subject
who realizes to have a certain belief,  but he also states (chiefly in his early writings,
around 1870) that the content of belief consists, in propositional terms, in a predicate
associated to a subject,  and, in semiotic terms (as he claims around 1885) in an icon
associated to an index.4 The indexical dimension consists in the fact that the object of
judgment  can  be  indicated  and shown.  The  ontological  thesis  (OT)  can  therefore  be
formulated as follows:
13 (OT) Judgment attributes a property to an object of judgment 
(where “attributes” is to be understood broadly, as including both the ascription and the
acknowledgment of a property).
14 This thesis is certainly true of legal judgment, which does not follow (at least not directly)
from a question like 
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(i) Which subjects exemplify the liability for a theft? 
but rather from a question like
(ii) Is Narses liable for this theft? 
15 The purport  of  OT is  lessened by the fact  that  our judgments are usually related to
entities of  which we already know certain aspects and must determine an additional
property.  In  these  instances  the  object  of  judgment  is  not  completely  devoid  of
connotation – on the contrary, all is known about it determines its connotation (or better,
determines  the  connotation  of  the  term  designating  such  object).  This  observation,
however,  does  not  undermine the  heart  of  OT in  any way,  that  is  to  say  the  thesis
whereby every judgment is matched by an object of judgment with reference to which a
property must be determined.
16 But the following objection might be raised: some types of judgment do not possess an
indexical dimension. If certain legal judgments like
(a) Narses is liable for this theft
(b) Narses is not liable for this theft
possess a clear-cut indexical dimension, others do not. For instance, moral judgments like
(c) Slavery is bad 
17 draw their strength from their generality. They attribute a predicate to a subject without
being indexical judgments. The indexical thesis does not apply to them. OT instead seems
to do so if we admit that not only specific entities (the theft involving Narses) but also
general entities (slavery) may constitute the object of a judgment. Of course, the type of
entity needs to be specified, but it can be admitted that such entities require some form
of reality for the moral judgment associated to them not to be totally meaningless.5 On
the other hand, in addition to such non-indexical moral judgments, there are examples of
judgments that are both moral and indexical, for instance 
(d) Theodore is generous.
18 Here OT also applies in its indexical dimension.6
19 But this implies a further and even stronger objection to OT: if the object of judgment is
an entity whatsoever (general or particular, abstract or concrete), OT looses much of its
interest  as  a  thesis.  It  runs  the  risk  of  turning  into  the  tautology  whereby  every
proposition has a subject. Let’s consider esthetic judgments like
(e) Le bateau ivre is the most beautiful poem by Rimbaud
(f) I tre filosofi by Giorgione is an amazing painting
or a political judgment like 
(g) The relations between North Korea and South Korea are very difficult.
20 Can it be argued that (e)-(g) judgments concern an object of judgment to the same extent
as (a) or (d)? Can we argue that the same ontological thesis applies to (a)-(g) judgments,
i.e. that every judgment qualifies an object of judgment? Yes, in a trivial sense it seems to
depend on the linguistic structure of judgments; but if we want OT to be interesting, then
we must specify the type of object we are dealing with. One may plausibly state that it
relates to a variety of entities – some individuals in (a) and (d), a universal in (c), some
works of art in (e) and (f), and some institutional entities in (g) – but the question remains
whether this thesis is truly an ontological one, namely a thesis about really existing things.
Here the alternative runs the risk of being the following one: saying that OT, at least in
the formulation herein, applies to judgment in general is tantamount to uttering either a
platitude or something false.
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The Alethic Thesis 
21 Insofar as judicial decisions aim to be just, they have to be based on true premises. As
Susan Haack has  recently  put  it  (2007:  14),  “factual  truth is  an essential  element  of
substantive justice; it really matters that the person who is punished be the person who
actually committed the crime or caused the injury.” Truth is a necessary condition of
justice and legal judgments claim to be true.7
22 So the ontological thesis ties on a second thesis about the relation between judgment and
truth. It may be called alethic. This thesis considers judgment as the attribution of a truth
value to a proposition. In this sense judgment is expressed by assertions like
(a) Narses is liable for this theft.
23 We have called ontological the aspect of judgment whereby an entity designated by a
propositional subject receives its connotation through a predicate. Concept predication is
capable of being either true or false and it is for this reason that we call it alethic thesis.
As Peirce argued in 1908, judgment is the effort to attain the acquisition of a truth, since in
judging that (a), for instance, the formed proposition is deemed true and approved as
such, accepting the various consequences thereof, including those related to conduct and
responsibility: 
24 even in solitary meditation every judgment is an effort to press home, upon the self of the
immediate future and of the general future, some truth. It is a genuine assertion, just as
the vernacular phrase represents it; and solitary dialectic is still of the nature of dialogue.
Consequently it  must be equally true that here too there is  contained an element of
assuming responsibility, of “taking the consequences” (CP 5.546).
25 Such an “effort” arises from a conjectural predication seeking confirmation or disproval.
It should be noted that, in Peirce’s view, a concept constitutive of a proposition makes its
appearance in the judgment before the proposition is approved: “the concept makes its
appearance  before  the  judgment  is  ripe,  when  it  is still  in  the  problematic  or
interrogatory mood” (CP 5.547). 
26 The concept is initially predicated “in the problematic or interrogatory mood” and only
at a later stage, if the initial conjecture is confirmed, it may become the content of a
justified  assertion.  This  dynamic  process  starts  therefore  with  a  conjectural  stage,
followed by an inquiry (mental or empirical, depending on the circumstances) and ends
with a result susceptible of being the content of an assertion. These observations provide
sufficient ground to consider a third thesis on the process of judgment, but before coming
to it, the significance and terms of this second thesis must be further specified.
27 The alethic thesis definitely applies to legal judgment that aims at establishing the truth
of (a) or (b), and equally to judgments like (c)-(g) implying a claim of truth regarding
their content.8 It can be argued that every judgment, regardless of the type, makes a
claim of truth about its content and that the alethic thesis (AT) applies to any type of
judgment,  and  consequently  to  judgment  in  general  too.  It  may  be  reformulated  as
follows: 
28 (AT) Judgment attributes a truth value to a proposition.
(where “attributes” is to be understood again in a broad sense, even though it alludes
here to recognition or acknowledgment rather than to ascription.)
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29 As previously stated, OT and AT stem from two different philosophical conceptions of
judgment, that can be articulated as follows. For (A) judgment is the attribution of a
predicate to a subject. For (B) it is the attribution of a truth value to a proposition (or
thought,  or belief  according to different philosophical  standpoints).  According to the
former  and  more  traditional  conception,  judgment  consists  in  an  association  or
separation of  ideas.9 (Saying that it  is  a predicate associated with a subject  makes it
definitely  more  precise).  The  latter  conception  was  expounded  by  Gottlob  Frege
(1848-1925).  According  to  the  German philosopher  (1879:  52  ff.)  judgment  is  the  act
through which the  truth of  a  thought  is  recognized.  The  proposition “If  Narses  has
committed  a  theft,  then  he  must  be  punished”  is  not  strictly  speaking  a  judgment.
Judging is the act of approving a proposition, or better, the act recognizing the truth
value of the thought expressed by the proposition. Frege, however, takes it a step further.
Albeit he does not consider it literally a definition, in 1892 he writes that judgment can be
regarded as an advance from a thought to its truth value.10 In 1918-19, in his Thought: a
Logical Investigation, he draws a distinction between (1) the apprehension of a thought –
thinking; (2) the recognition of the truth of a thought – judgment; (3) the manifestation of
this  thought  –  assertion.11 Despite  the  important  differences  between  the  two
philosophers (in metaphysics, in particular, Frege is a Platonist while Peirce is a Scotist),
Frege’s distinctions somewhat resemble the dynamics hinted at by Peirce when he refers
to an effort to acquire a truth capable of being asserted.
30 Moreover, these observations can be usefully compared with some of Dewey’s ideas. In
1912 he discriminates between a broad and a narrow sense of the term “judgment.” 
31 This term is employed in a larger and more vital sense and in a narrower and more
formal one. In its pregnant sense it means the act (or the power) of weighing facts or
evidence, in order to reach a conclusion or decision; or (as is usual with words denoting
acts)  the result,  the outcome of  the process,  the decision reached by the process  of
reflective inquiry and deliberation (MW 7: 262).
32 In its narrower and more technical sense a judgment is a statement of a relation between
two objects, or between two contents of thought, two meanings (MW 7: 264). 
33 Dewey’s narrow and formal sense of judgment resembles judgment in sense (A), and since
(A) is the association of a predicate and a subject, it generates a judgment in sense (B),
that is, an act of assent to a proposition. It should also be noted that judgment in its
“broad and vital” sense overlaps with conception (C):  on the one hand,  as  a process
characterized by a plurality of  moments and,  on the other,  as  the conclusion of  the
process.  (Dewey will  come back to these thoughts in 1938).  As the genetic thesis will
exemplify, this can be articulated as follows: it is a process starting with a hypothesis on
the object of judgment, which continues through a proper investigation and ends with
the settlement of what is true about the object of judgment and the consequences of it.12
34 To sum up, Frege refers to an advance; Pierce suggests to use the word effort; Dewey talks
about a vital sense of judgment. These are different metaphors by different philosophers.
Nonetheless, they show that judgment is not something that one gets in one shot, so to
speak; it is a complex phenomenon and is formed by a process.13
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The Genetic Thesis
35 There is still a third perspective. Insofar as judicial decisions are not made in one shot, so
to say, but follow some procedures, legal judgments are structured in different temporal
and functional parts (like the forming of a hypothesis, the testing of it, a decision on it).14
This is also true of judgment in general.
36 Judgment can be observed in its various moments (or stages,  if we consider a complex
judging practice like the legal one). We shall call this third perspective genetic thesis. It
accounts for the temporal  and reflexive  dimension of  judgment,  as  well  for  its  components:
conjecture, observation and evaluation. Here is a general formulation of this thesis: 
37 (GT) Judgment is a process whose result is the attribution of a truth value.
38 OT and AT concern the nature of judgment (what a judgment is); GT is about its dynamics 
(how  a  judgment  is  formed).  GT  aims  at  providing  a  theoretical  articulation  of  the
“ripening” process  of  judgment.  It  is  a  logical  and psychological  process,  with some
cognitive and inferential components and, if required by the hypothesis, an empirical
dimension.
39 According to Peirce, judgment is something ripening in the mind, it is an effort for the
acquisition of truth (CP 5.546) or, in other words, an effort for the determination of a
belief, with the warning that, in the event of it proving false, it would entail negative
consequences for the agent applying it in his conduct.15 In my opinion, judgment as a
ripening process may be articulated in three fundamental moments: hypothesis, inquiry,
result. The “non-ripe judgment,” where the concept is present “in the problematic or
interrogatory mood,”  corresponds to  the moment  of  hypothesis.  The “ripe judgment”
corresponds to the result  of the inquiry.  The “effort” through which the truth of the
hypothesis is checked, corresponds to the inquiry (cf. CP 5.547). In summary:
(1) the hypothesis attributes a property to an object of judgment in a provisional way; 
(2) the inquiry evaluates the hypothesis; 
(3) the result attributes a truth value to the hypothesis evaluated by means of the inquiry.
40 GT may also result from the application, to the judgment-forming process, of the logic of
scientific inquiry expounded by Peirce in 1877 and then modulated in inferential terms
after 1900.16 The genetic thesis, however, is mainly related to Dewey’s considerations on
the relation between judgment in general and legal judgment. In Dewey’s Logic: the Theory
of  Inquiry  (1938),  as  we  said  at  the  beginning,  legal  judgment  is  a  model  for  the
understanding of judgment in general. Legal judgment is defined by the three following
aspects, deemed of fundamental importance by Dewey (LW 12: 123-5):
1) there is an initial uncertainty and a dispute on what has taken place or on its meaning;
17
2) the dispute is settled through an inquiry and evaluation of the elements produced by
the parties involved: evidence is produced about the relevant facts18 together with the
relevant conceptual considerations, rules and principles which are in force in the legal
system;19 
3) the final judgment determines the legal consequences of the case.20
41 Dewey deems these features true of judgment in general. According to his third point, in
fact, the final judgment determines the legal consequences of the factual qualification and
reconstruction, whereas, to come back to our theses, according to the third moment of
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GT, judgment determines the truth of a proposition. There is undoubtedly a difference,
but neither a tension nor a contradiction,  since the propositional nature of the final
judgment implies the consequences of the judged proposition (in compliance with the
pragmatist  principle  of  significance,  enunciated  by Peirce’s  pragmatic  maxim21).  The
genetic thesis will be better appreciated once related to the other theses on judgment. As
we saw, there is indeed a close connection between OT and AT on the one hand and the
(A) and (B) conception of judgment on the other. According to conception (A), judgment
is the attribution of a predicate to a subject. According to conception (B) it is the act of
assent  to  the  formed  proposition.  For  OT  judgment  is  the  determination  of  the
connotation of a propositional subject. For AT it is the attribution of a truth value to the
formed proposition. How are these two theses articulated? They are articulated in the
terms of GT and the (C) conception of judgment, i.e. the thesis referring to judgment as a
ripening process,  from a interrogatory and conjectural  stage to a final  assertive one,
through an inquiry, be it empirical or mental, simple or complex, short or long, according
to the object of judgment. Moreover, this way of specifying (C) complies with the logical
constraints implied by (A) and (B).
42 It goes without saying that GT is valid for legal judgment. The question is whether it is
equally valid for judgment in general. Does the dynamics highlighted by GT apply to all
types  of  judgment?  Or  does  it  only  apply  to  judgments  needing  an  inquiry  or  a
particularly  complex  reflection?  With  immediate  judgments  (for  instance  perceptual
judgments),  it  would  be  plausible  to  consider  GT  as  false.  But  Peirce  argues  that  a
perceptual judgment possesses an inferential character, despite the immediate, neither
inferential nor propositional, character of a percept.22 In short, the genetic thesis does
not apply to immediate judgments, but it is highly uncertain whether something of that
kind exists beyond the most elementary perceptual judgments.
43 Furthermore, Peirce emphasizes that judgments are distinctive of beings endowed with
self-control skills (cf. CP 5.115, 5.133, 5.533). As such, judging subjects are responsible for
their  own  judgments.  GT  is  particularly  relevant  in  this  respect:  the  possibility  to
elucidate the dynamics of judgment involves the possibility to elucidate the reasons of
judgment (if  this  dynamics  falls  within the scope of  self-control,  of  course).  On what
grounds  has  the  truth  of  (a)  or  (b)  been  established?  What  evidence,  what  inquiry
processes, what considerations led to judging Narses guilty? On the contrary, immediate
judgments do not imply any responsibility, if it is true that some judgments are formed
outside the dimension of self-control. In this sense, GT can cover the normative aspects of 
judging.
44 Summing up: OT and AT account for the nature of judgment, GT accounts for its dynamic
aspect (in compliance with the logical constraints implied by the two theses on the nature
of judgment). According to OT, judging presupposes an object of judgment and the nature
of judgment consists in the attribution of a certain property to the object. In a certain
way,  one might  claim that  every judgment is  provoked by an object  that  requires  a
qualification.
45 This also reveals that judgment is founded, on the one hand, on the ontological status of
the  object  and,  on  the  other,  on  the  cognitive  and  evaluative  components  of  the
qualification. According to AT, judgment consists in the attribution of a truth value to the
proposition predicating a certain property of the object of judgment. Thus, OT and AT
find a confirmation in the dynamic process pointed out by GT: the ontological thesis
specifically  concerns  the  first  moment  in  the  judging  process,  that  is  to  say,  the
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hypothetical attribution of a predicate to a subject, whereas the alethic thesis concerns
the last moment, that is the determination of the truth value of the hypothesis.
46 Having said this, how can it be related to Dewey’s idea of legal judgment as a model of
judgment in general? More specifically, how can Dewey’s hypothesis be confirmed with
respect to the issues raised about OT? Let us consider the three theses once again:
(OT) Judgment attributes a property to an object of judgment
(AT) Judgment attributes a truth value to a proposition
(GT) Judgment is a process whose result is the attribution of a truth value.
47 Apparently AT and GT do not raise any particular issues: AT is not in contradiction with
Dewey’s idea and GT, in particular,  meets with his theses on judgment.  The problem
remains with OT. We have already established that it is either trivial or wrong to say that
OT  –  at  least  in  the  current  formulation  –  applies  to  judgment  in  general;  as  a
consequence, also Dewey’s hypothesis, at least with respect to this thesis, is equally trivial
or wrong. On the other hand, at least for the purpose of a conceptual analysis – a trivial
truth is preferable to a falsity: let us then take OT as a trivial truth (or, let us take it in the
sense that from a logical point of view necessarily a judgment has a propositional subject
that designates an object). It should be recalled at this point that it is the conjunction of
the three theses that accounts for judgment. Then the question is: does the triviality of
OT imply the triviality of the conjunction of the three theses? The answer is a negative
one. Even if OT is trivially true of judgment in general, the conjunction of the three theses
is  not necessarily trivial.  This is  confirmed a posteriori  if  we consider the details and
implications of AT and GT with relation to the ontological thesis.
48 Dewey’s hypothesis is thus confirmed and it can be concluded that the conjunction of the
three theses holds true for judgment in general, and does so in a non trivial way.23 Indeed,
this  conjunction  has  some  important  consequences  for  a  theory  of  judgment.  For
instance, it accounts for the relations between judgment, inference and assertion. These
relations  raise  the  more  general  question  of  the  social  and  normative  dimension  of
judgment and it is precisely on this that we would like to develop a final proposal.
49 The  social  dimension  of  judgment  consists  in  the  social  character  of  its  conceptual
contents  and  in  the  public  dimension  of  the  assertion  of  its  results.  Following
Wittgenstein (§ 580 of his Philosophical Investigations) it can be claimed that judgment is an
“internal  process” requiring “external  criteria.”  It  might be added that  the semantic
conditions of this process are equally “external”: the semantic and conceptual content of
our judgments is determined by the social practices determining the inferential role of
the words and concepts we use.24 On an even more straightforward ground, one may
observe that its social dimension is determined by the public dimension of the assertion
of its results. Because of it having an eminently public character, legal judgment is thus a
true model of judgment in general. There is no private law nor private legal judgment in
the sense of secrete law or judgment, insofar as the law aims to rule the conduct of its
addressees.25 Responsibility is  associated to  this  character,  on the account  of  its  close
relation with the assertive act. 
50 The following question arises then: does assertion belong to the judgment process or not?
If judgment in the (B) sense is the act attributing a truth value to judgment formed in the
(A) sense, this does not imply the assertion of its content. However, if our assertions were
completely separated from the rest, the assertion of a content, per se, irrespective of the
process leading to it and its underlying reasons, would raise issues of responsibility very
hard to evaluate.  How to evaluate the responsibility of an assertion without knowing
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what process it originates from? There is agreement on one point – assertion is an act
entailing  responsibility  with  relation  to  the  interlocutors  of  the  speaker26 –  but  the
question remains about the criteria to evaluate such a responsibility. An assertive act, in
and of itself,  is not sufficient for the purpose of that evaluation. Sure enough, in our
practice, our evaluations are not limited to assertions only but embrace the processes
leading or expected to lead to them.
51 Hence, with due consideration for the social dimension of our judgments, the suggestion
is to consider assertion as part of the complex process of judging, and to evaluate its
responsibilities with respect to this process. If assertion were separate from the other
constitutive parts of judgment, its sense and consequences would be hard to establish.
Assertion is the part of judgment that manifests the results of our inquiries or reflections
and assumes responsibility for them. In summary, judgment in a complex sense may be
articulated as follows:
(a) mental act attributing a predicate to a subject
(b) assenting to (the truth of) a predication 
(c) asserting a predication.
52 These  points  articulate  a  complex  conception  of  judgment,  encompassing  assertion.
Following  this  conception,  judgment  consists  of  three fundamental  acts  (predication,
assent, assertion) and epistemically speaking, of three fundamental moments (hypothesis,
inquiry, result). This understanding makes it possible to account for its components, its
logical constraints and finally its public dimension. The truth claims associated to the
conclusions are thus justified and validated.
53 This does not count as a denial of the psychological dimension of judgment. Judging starts
with  processes  belonging  to  such  a  dimension  (first  of  all,  the  formulation  of  a
hypothesis). But the import of their contents would inevitably remain indeterminate for
us if those processes and their results were not to be publicly manifested, compared and
evaluated.
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NOTES
1. See  however  Russell’s  theory  of  judgment  in  the  first  half  of  the  century,  discussed  by
Wittgenstein  and  Ramsey  among  others  (cf.  Russell  1910:  147-59,  Ramsey  1927-29),  and  see
Husserl’s later thoughts (1939).
2. “What is the essence of a Judgment? A judgment is the mental act by which the judger seeks to
impress upon himself the truth of the proposition. It is much the same as an act of asserting the
proposition, or going before a notary and assuming formal responsibility for its truth, except
that  those  acts  are  intended to  affect  others,  while  the  judgment  is  only  intended to  affect
oneself” (CP 2.252). Cf. W4: 164, CP 2.309, CP 8.115, CP 8.337, NEM 4: 39.
3. The articulation of judgment in propositional terms allows Peirce to perform (especially in his
early writings) a logical analysis of judgment; cf. Tiercelin (1985: 246 n. 94); see also Tiercelin
(1993: chaps. 1 and 4). Cf. W1: 152, W2: 179, CP 5.115.
4. “This act which amounts to such a resolve, is a peculiar act of the will whereby we cause an
image, or icon, to be associated, in a particular strenuous way, with an object represented to us by
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an index. This act itself is represented in the proposition by a symbol, and the consciousness of it
fulfills the function of a symbol in the judgment” (CP 2.435). Articulating an index with an icon
generates, according to Peirce, a symbol, that is a logical and conventional sign that is capable of
having a truth value.
5. Dancy’s  moral  particularism (1993)  could  be easily  harmonized with OT,  but  the question
remains whether or not it is a satisfactory theory of moral judgments. See also Putnam (2004:
26-7) commenting on Levinas’s moral philosophy: “Levinas’s thought experiment is always to
imagine myself confronted with one single suffering human being, ignoring for the moment the
likelihood that I am already under obligation to many other human beings. I am supposed to feel
the  obligation to  help  this  human being,  an obligation which I  am to  experience  not  as  the
obligation to obey a principle, as a Kantian would, but as an obligation to that human being.”
6. If  then one might go as  far  as  to  argue that  non-indexical  moral  judgments  stem from a
generalization starting from specific instances, non-indexical moral judgments would rest all the
same on an indexical basis. A similar relation applies between the judgments of the lower and
higher courts in the legal domain. Cf. Twining (1991: 336) on the importance of concrete cases in
a common law perspective.
7. Cf. Summers 1999. But, on the tensions between science and law, see Haack 2004.
8. On the other hand one may wonder what would the truth of (c) and (e) consist of. Are there
any moral and esthetic truths? Are there any moral and esthetic facts making (c) and (e) true?
Are (c) and (e), instead, expressions of feelings without any truth value? Are they norms, that is
ought-judgments instead of is-judgments? One may very well contend, in any case, that there are
propositions  (true  or  false)  describing  moral  or  esthetic  feelings  (neither  true  or  false)  or
describing norms (neither true or false). 
9. Cf. in particular Arnauld and Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser, II. In the contemporary debate
cf. McDowell 1994.
10. Frege (1892: 159): “Judgements can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth-value.
Naturally this cannot be a definition. Judgement is something quite peculiar and incomparable.”
11. Frege  (1918-19:  329).  In his second logical  investigation (Negation),  compare the distinction
between (1) grasping a thought, and (2) judging: we can grasp the meaning of an interrogative
sentence without knowing its truth value (Frege 1918-19:  347-8). Cf. Bell 1979, Picardi 1997, and
Tuzet 2006.
12. “In this sense judgment expresses the very heart of  thinking.  All  thinking is,  directly or
indirectly, a part of the act of judging, of forming an estimate or valuation after investigation and
testing” (MW 7: 262).
13. But see Ramsey (1927-29: 46), who conceives of judging as including any form of “thinking
that” independently of the way it is arrived at.
14. See  e.g.  Damaška  1986.  Such  parts,  while  often  informal  and  unreflected  in  ordinary
judgments,  are  normatively  determined  in  legal  judgments  structured  according  to  certain
procedures.
15. “A judgment is a mental act deliberately exercising a force tending to determine in the mind
of the agent a belief in the proposition: to which should perhaps be added that the agent must be
aware of his being liable to inconvenience in the event of the proposition’s proving false in any
practical aspect” (NEM 4: 250).
16. See of 1877 The Fixation of Belief (CP 5.358-387; W3: 242-57). Cf. of 1901 On the Logic of Drawing
History from Ancient Documents (CP 7.162-255).
17. “There is uncertainty and dispute about what shall be done because there is a conflict about
the significance of what has taken place, even if there is agreement about what has taken place as
a matter of fact – which, of course, is not always the case. The judicial settlement is a settlement
of an issue because it decides existential conditions in their bearing upon further activities: the
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essence of the significance of any state of facts” (LW 12: 123-4). On Dewey’s theory of judgment
cf. Frega 2006.
18. “On the one hand, propositions are advanced about the states of facts involved. Witnesses
testify to what they have heard and seen; written records are offered, etc. This subject-matter is
capable  of  direct  observation  and  has  existential  reference.  As  each  party  to  the  discussion
produces its evidential material, the latter is intended to point to a determinate decision as a
resolution of the as yet undetermined situation. The decision takes effect in a definite existential
reconstruction” (LW 12: 124).
19. “On the other hand, there are propositions about conceptual subject-matter; rules of law are
adduced to determine the admissibility (relevancy) and the weight of facts offered as evidence.
The significance of factual material is fixed by the rules of the existing juridical system; it is not
carried by the facts independent of the conceptual structure which interprets them. And yet, the
quality of the problematic situation determines which rules of the total system are selected” (LW 
12: 124). On Dewey, law and democracy cf. Talisse 2010, and Butler 2010.
20. “The final judgment arrived at is a settlement. The case is disposed of; the disposition takes
effect  in  existential  consequences.  The sentence  or  proposition is  not  an end in  itself  but  a
decisive directive of future activities. […] While prior propositions are means of instituting the
sentence, the sentence is terminal as a means of instituting a definite existential situation” (LW 
12:  124-5).  On legal  reasoning see among others MacCormick 1978,  Aarnio-MacCormick 1992,
Wróblewski 1992, Tuzet 2010.
21. “Consider  what  effects,  that  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings,  we  conceive  the
object  of  our  conception to  have.  Then,  our  conception of  these  effects  is  the  whole  of  our
conception of the object” (CP 5.402, 1878). Cf. CP 8.33 (1871); W3: 77, 108 (1873); CP 5.432, 5.438
(1905). 
22. Cf. Hookway (1985: chap. 5); Tiercelin (1993: chaps. 2-3); Tuzet 2003.
23. Is “confirmed” too strong a term here? I don’t think so, if Dewey’s hypothesis is found to be
true.
24. Cf. Brandom 1994, and 2000; Esfeld 1999.
25. See Fuller (1969: 49-51).
26. See  CP  2.314-315,  2.252,  CP  5.30,  5.546-548,  NEM  4:  39.  On  knowledge  and  assertion  cf.
Williamson 1996. On assertion, acceptance and meaning cf.  Dummett (2003: 11):  “A theory of
meaning given in terms of  the grounds for  asserting a  statement I  shall  call  a  justificationist 
theory; one given in terms of the consequences of accepting a statement I shall call a pragmatist 
theory.” For a distinction between assent and acceptance cf. Engel 1999.
ABSTRACTS
The article  addresses  three theses  on judgment in  general  and legal  judgment in  particular,
starting from Peirce’s and Dewey’s claims about them. The first thesis, ontological, concerns the
content of an act of judgment and says that judgment is about an object instantiating a property
(not  about  a  property  instantiated  by  an  object). The  second,  alethic,  concerns  the  relation
between judgment and truth and says that judgment is  the attribution of  a truth value to a
proposition. The third,  genetic,  deals  with the moments  of  judgment claiming it  is  a  process
susceptible of being articulated in such moments. Its fundamental moments are 1) hypothesis, 2)
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inquiry,  3)  result. The  article  claims  that  the  three  theses  interconnect  and  hold  for  both
judgment in general and legal judgment, given that the latter is a model of the former; so a
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